CAS article no. 0064/2016
Introduction
This presentation compares and contrasts two major initiatives that will impact on the security of the maritime domain in the approaches to the Straits of Malacca in coming years: President Xi Jinping’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and President Joko Widodo’s Global Maritime Fulcrum. This presentation begins by summarising the key elements of each initiative. Both have a strong domestic economic focus. The presentation then considers four questions: (1) what are the motivating factors behind each initiative? (2) what is the scope of each initiative? (3) what are the security benefits of each initiative? and (4) what are the potential security risks and pitfalls of each initiative? This presentation concludes by offering a broad net assessment of these initiatives on the geo-politics of the maritime region centred on the Straits of Malacca. If successful, both China and Indonesia will enhance their political and strategic influence; but Indonesia and other Southeast Asian maritime states will resist the superimposition of China’s grand strategy on their autonomy.[1]
1. Overview
According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asia’s demand for new investments in infrastructure – estimated at $8 trillion for the period 2010-2020 (or $800 billion per year) -– far exceeds the capacity of existing multilateral lending agencies. The ADB itself can provide only about $10 billion in loans per year for infrastructure. In 2014, the ADB provided nearly $14 billion on new projects in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN Infrastructure Fund, a joint arrangement between the ADB and ASEAN, only had $485 million to invest.[2]
During the 2010-2020 time frame Indonesia is estimated to require $230 billion for infrastructure development, while the countries comprising the Greater Mekong Sub-region (Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam) are estimated to need $50 billion. In the period from 2015 to 2030 countries in Southeast Asia plan to spend an estimated $7 trillion to upgrade infrastructure.[3]
Where are the investment funds going to come from?
Maritime Silk Road. The Maritime Silk Road initiative is part of China’s broader strategic thrust. In September-October 2013, President Xi Jinping proposed two initiatives on his visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia – a Silk Road Economic Belt and a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. These two initiatives have been grouped under the expression One Belt, One Road (OBOR). A major aim of the OBOR initiative is to fund a broad range of infrastructure in order to promote greater connectivity by air, land and sea between China, Eurasia, Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.
President Xi formally announced China’s OBOR initiative at the Boao Forum for Asia annual conference on Hainan Island on 28 March 2015. At the same time, China’s National Development and Reform Commission released a comprehensive overview in a document entitled Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road.[4]
After President Xi’s visit to Indonesia in October 2013, Premier Li Keqiang addressed the China-ASEAN Expo and tabled the proposal to build a Maritime Silk Road orientated towards the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to be jointly funded by China and the individual members of ASEAN. In March 2016, Premier Li offered five Southeast Asian countries $10 billion in credits and $1.54 billion in preferential loans for infrastructure development along the Mekong River.[5]
According to the HSBC, China’s proposed New Silk Road Initiative is estimated to cost $232 billion. China has identified the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (formerly BRIC’s Bank), and the Silk Road Fund as the prime lending agencies.[6] The AIIB has now been established with fifty-seven founding members (not including Japan and the United States). China will provide the lion’s share of the $100 billion proposed initial capital. The China also has agreed to cooperate with the ADB.
The Silk Road Fund is a limited liability company set up in China with a registered capital of $10 billion. Its shareholders include the China Investment Corporation (sovereign wealth fund under the Ministry of Finance), China Development Bank, Export Import Bank of China and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. The Silk Road Fund, under the control of the People’s Bank of China, is expected to attain $40 billion in investment capital.[7] Its first project was a $4 billion investment to upgrade Pakistan’s railway network.[8]
Global Maritime Fulcrum. Indonesia’s Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) raised the theme of the salience of Indonesia’s archipelagic maritime domain during national elections and in his inaugural speech as President to Parliament on 20 October 2014.[9] President Jokowi later announced his Global Maritime Fulcrum (poros maritime dunia) strategy at the East Asia Summit in Myanmar on 13 November 2014.[10] Like China’s OBOR, it too is aimed developing Indonesia’s maritime infrastructure with a priority on upgrading and developing Indonesia’s ports maritime transport, shipbuilding industry, domestic tourism, and maritime forces, both civil and military.[11]
According to two Indonesian academic specialists, President Jokowi’s overarching concept of a Global Maritime Fulcrum is the centrepiece of his administration. In their view:
It fundamentally represents a national vision and development agenda to rebuild the country’s maritime culture and expand its economy. The concept also signifies a new strategic doctrine that projects Indonesia to become a maritime power with considerable diplomatic influence. Specifically, the Jokowi administration seeks to play a central role in two vast maritime regions – the Indian and Pacific oceans.[12]
2. What are the motivating factors behind each initiative?
Maritime Silk Road. China’s OBOR initiative is the centrepiece of the economic, political and strategic policy framework adopted by China’s Fifth Generation Leadership under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping.[13] It is the culmination of China’s earlier ’going out’ policy and it is part and parcel of Xi’s ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ and his ‘China Dream’.[14] According to Christopher Johnson, ‘The purpose of (China’s) foreign relations remains first and foremost to secure good external conditions for China’s reform, development and stability…’[15] He also observed that
In many ways, OBOR serves as the embodiment and executive agent of recent changes President Xi has made to the ways China envisions itself interacting with the world. In particular, and as is the case in so many other policy areas, Xi’s unique contribution appears to seek absolute alignment between China’s foreign economic diplomacy and the CCP-driven policy framework emerging as a hallmark of his tenure.[16]
According to Johnson, there are three CCP foreign policy tenets and concepts that underpin Xi’s OBOR initiative:
The ‘period of strategic opportunity’ up to 2020 during which the external security environment will be conducive for China to concentrate on internal development.
The concept of ‘peaceful development’ that China’s rise can only be achieved by peaceful means and ‘win-win’ outcomes for China and its neighbours and partners.
The stress on two important anniversaries: the hundredth anniversary of the founding of the CCP (2021) and the centenary of the People’s Republic of China (2049).[17]
Global Maritime Fulcrum. President Jokowi is seeking to revive Indonesia’s maritime past. His initiative may be seen as an extension of Indonesia’s archipelagic concept (wawasan nusantara) in which the sea ‘was the medium that unified’ a sprawling archipelago. For example, in his inaugural speech to parliament on 20 October 2014 he said:
We have for far too long turned out back on the seas, the oceans, the straits, and the bays. [The time has come to] ‘restore Indonesia as a maritime country.’[18]
3. What is the scope of each initiative?
Maritime Silk Road. China’s Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road sets out the overall framework of Xi’s OBOR initiative under seven heading: background, principles, framework, cooperation priorities, cooperation mechanisms, China’s regions in pursuing opening up, and China in Action.[19] Xi’s OBOR is breath-taking in its scope:
The Belt and Road Initiative aims to promote the connectivity of Asian, European and African continents and their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen partnerships among the countries along the Belt and Road, set up all dimensional, multi-tiered and composite connectivity networks, and realize diversified, independent, balanced and sustainable development in these countries. The connectivity projects of the Initiative will help align and coordinate the development strategies of the countries along the Belt and Road, tap market potential in this region, promote investment and consumption, create demands and job opportunities, enhance people-to-people and cultural exchanges, and mutual learning among the peoples of the relevant countries, and enable them to understand, trust and respect each other and live in harmony, peace and prosperity.[20]
With reference to the Maritime Silk Road, Xi’s initiative envisages two sea routes, one from China’s east coast to Europe via the South China Sea and the other from China’s east coast to the South Pacific via the South China Sea.[21] China would give priority to ‘jointly building smooth, secure and efficient transport routes connecting major sea ports along the Belt and Road’ such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic corridor.[22] In addition, China has identified priority areas to promote cooperation: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bond.[23]
China’s vision of financial arrangements is expansive and includes pan-Asian systems for currency stability, investment and finance, and credit information and expanded bilateral currency swap and settlement arrangements. China also envisages multilateral cooperation to provide syndicated loans and bank credit including permitting companies and financial institutions along the OBOR with good credit standing to issue Renminbi denominated bonds in China. Chinese financial institutions and companies with good credit ratings would be permitted to issue bonds in Renminbi and foreign currencies outside China. Further, China would like to expand practical cooperation through the China-ASEAN Interbank Association.[24]
China also has identified four cooperation mechanisms: existing bilateral arrangements (joint committee, mixed committee, coordinating committee, steering committee and management committee), Memoranda of Understanding or plans, bilateral cooperation projects and bilateral joint working mechanisms. China also singled out existing multilateral institutions and fora, including ASEAN Plus China (ASEAN Plus 1), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Asia-Europe Meeting, Asia Cooperation Dialogue, Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, the Greater Mekong Subregion, the Boao Forum for Asia, and the China-ASEAN Expo. To cap this off, China proposed to set up an international summit forum on the One Belt and One Road Initiative.[25]
China’s OBOR master plan includes a major stress on the role of involving China’s provinces and regions. For example, the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region in the southwest would interact with ASEAN countries. The Beibu (Tonkin) Gulf Economic Zone and the Pearl River-Xijang Economic Zone would link up to form ‘an international corridor opening to the ASEAN region.’[26] In addition, China’s plans include:
[making] good use of the geographic advantage of Yunnan Province, advance the construction of an international transport corridor connecting China with neighboring countries, develop a new highlight of economic cooperation in the Greater Mekong Sub-region and make the region a pivot of China’s opening-up to South and Southeast Asia.[27]
In November 2014, President Xi announced at the APEC Summit in Beijing that China would establish a $40 billion fund to finance infrastructure construction as part of the OBOR initiative while the Bank of China announced plans to extend $20 billion in credit to OBOR-related projects in 2015 and $100 billion over the next three years. After the APEC meeting Xi delivered a major policy speech to the Chinese Communist Party’s Foreign Affairs Work Conference. Xi stated, ‘We should prepare timetables and road maps for the coming years for the OBOR project and will focus on some significant projects and let the construction of OBOR commence as soon as possible.’ [28]
China’s One Belt One Road Initiative embraces up to sixty-five countries with a combined population of 4.4 billion or sixty-three per cent of the world’s population and twenty-nine per cent of the worlds Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or $21 trillion. The Maritime Silk Road envisages linking China with eleven countries in Southeast Asia and seven countries in South Asia for a total of eighteen.[29]
Global Maritime Fulcrum. The scope of President Jokowi’s Global Maritime Fulcrum ranges across the entire Indonesian archipelago with the aim of improving maritime connectivity and infrastructure internally as well as linking the Indonesian archipelago to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It is focused on both internal passageways and international passageways. The ‘external’ dimension of the Global Maritime Fulcrum is focused on ending illegal unreported and unregulated fishing (IUUF) in Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as well as smuggling and piracy, and developing maritime defence forces capable of deterring external states.[30]
According to President Jokowi five pillars support his concept of the Global Maritime Fulcrum: maritime culture, marine resources, archipelagic connectivity, maritime diplomacy, and naval modernisation.[31]
According to Gindarsah and Priamarizki the Global Maritime Fulcrum
Would improve maritime connectivity and infrastructure – such as building ‘sea highways’, constructing deep seaports and logistical networks as well as developing indigenous maritime tourism, fishing and shipping industries. It also seeks to maintain and manage marine resources to ensure the country’s ‘food sovereignty’.[32]
Scott Bentley concludes:
While Indonesia’s president has made clear that he intends to work with China as an economic partner, including seeking its investment in building maritime connectivity, he has also emphasised that he will not allow such cooperation to compromise Indonesia’s sovereignty or jurisdiction.[33]
4. What are the security benefits of each initiative?
Maritime Silk Road. The OBOR initiative aims to link China’s western regions over land with Eurasia, ensure safe navigation by sea and improved relations with countries that lie along both land and sea routes. As the OBOR initiative matures China would strengthened its presence in Central Asia/Eurasia and, at the same time, would have reduced the ‘Malacca Dilemma’.[34]
China’s OBOR initiative is primarily aimed at domestic economic development by enlisting the provinces on China’s borders as well as underperforming regions (Xinjiang, Ningxia, Qinghai and Yunnan) and rust belt provinces in the northeast and integrating them in an externally orientated development program.[35] OBOR might mitigate security challenges on China’s periphery such as instability in Afghanistan.
The OBOR initiative would absorb China’s industrial iron, construction materials such as steel, cement and heavy machinery.[36]
OBOR would be a proverbial lifeline to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that are over burdened with debt and non-performing loans by injecting new capital from state banks that would not be available otherwise. New capital would also enable China’s larger SOEs to transform themselves into internationally competitive global companies.[37]
China’s OBOR initiative would benefit the countries that participated in it by addressing their massive demand for investment in developing infrastructure. Both China and the participating countries would benefit from secure market access, efficient customs clearances, secure banking, interstate money exchange facilities, comprehensive infrastructure development, and security along sea lines of communication (SLOCs). In sum, OBOR would provide mutual benefits to all the parties and economic growth would spill over and positively impact on internal security.
Finally, China would emerge with a greater role in the global economy and greater influence over the global financial infrastructure.
Global Maritime Fulcrum. Jokowi’s Global Maritime Fulcrum is primarily aimed at developing Indonesia’s domestic economy/ Indonesia wants to develop and modernize its internal infrastructure and maritime connectivity, develop its fishing and shipping industries. The Global Maritime Fulcrum also has explicit security and defence objectives including modernization of Indonesia’s maritime forces including the navy and coast guard and stepping up defence diplomacy.[38]
President Widodo’s emphasis on maritime diplomacy will result in greater diplomatic efforts to negotiate unresolved territorial and maritime jurisdictions with neighbouring states.[39]
Indonesia also seeks to develop its capacity for maritime law enforcement and modernize its navy to deter foreign intrusions into Indonesian waters. Indonesia’s capacity to meet these objectives will be closely tied to maintaining relatively high growth rates that will enable Indonesia to increase the per cent of GDP spent on defence from one to 1.5 per cent.[40]
If Indonesia’s increased its capacity for maritime law enforcement, it would be able to reduce illegal unreported and unregulated fishing in its EEZ that cost Indonesia an estimated $20-24 billion each year.[41]
Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum could see renewed efforts by the newly created Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) to deal with piracy at its root source in Indonesia.
In order to achieve the objectives of the Global Maritime Fulcrum Indonesia must attract overseas investment. This provides an opportunity to align China’s Maritime Silk Road funding for Indonesian maritime infrastructure priorities.[42] This could have the effect of spurring competing investment from Japan, the United States, South Korea, Australia and Europe.[43] This competitive dynamic also applies to expanding bilateral cooperation in modernizing Indonesia’s defence.[44]
President Jokowi’s stress on a two-ocean outlook has already resulted in Indonesia’s raised participation in Indian Ocean affairs as exemplified by its chairmanship of Indian Ocean Rim Association in 2015.[45]
5. What are the potential security risks and pitfalls of each initiative?
Maritime Silk Road. China’s OBOR initiative is historically unprecedented. It is several times greater than the scope of the Marshal Plan.[46] The major risk is the continuing slowdown in the Chinese economy fuelled by scepticism about China’s official GDP growth rate figures.[47] A slowdown in Chinese growth would reduce to a certain extent China’s role in regional trade and investment.
Critics have questioned whether China has the requisite experience, human capital and technological knowhow and expertise to manage such a gargantuan project involving so many central government ministries and agencies as well as provincial governments.[48] There is a risk that some provinces may seek funds primarily to assist debt-ridden state-owned enterprises or that OBOR projects could encourage adventurism by Chinese SOEs looking to expand overseas. Another risk is that some projects may turn out to be economically unviable.
OBOR is more of a sweeping vision with a multitude of objectives than an operational blueprint. Critics charge that OBOR is too hasty, too broad, too ambitious, and without sufficient preparation that could result in financial wastage. One of the potential major pitfalls is how China will deal with unexpected contingencies such as: economic difficulties such as credit risks, environmental issues (for example, the Mitsore dam in Myanmar[49]), political instability and insecurity arising from ethnic and religious complexities., especially where land routes are linked to seaports along the Maritime Silk Road.
China’s OBOR initiative is supposed to provide mutual benefits for the parties involved. Many of the mooted OBOR projects are high-profile ones involving China and the host governments. Set backs and failures could have domestic repercussions. There are multiple risks that OBOR will be viewed a self-serving by host governments and companies thus generating concerns over competition as new markets open up and over dependence on economic networks centred on China.[50]
China’s development of ports in Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan (Gwadar) are likely to raise alarm bells in India about China’s intrusion into the Indian Ocean if not Chinese encirclement and isolation of India.[51]
Global Maritime Fulcrum. As Scott Bentley has pointed out, there is an inherent tension between the domestic development focus of Indonesia’s third pillar of its Global Maritime Fulcrum with the fourth and fifth pillars that focus on national security and defence.[52] In addition, there is also the risk of the Army’s reaction to a decrease in funding and/or role in favour of the navy.
President Jokowi’s prime focus on protecting and defending Indonesian sovereignty especially in reducing if not eliminating IUUF has already produced tensions in its relations with China.[53] As Indonesia’s capacity for maritime law enforcement develops there is a risk of further clashes at sea between the coast guard agencies of both countries.
President Jokowi’s nationalism will reinforce Indonesia’s past reluctance to become involved in multilateral efforts to tackle the regional piracy.
6. Net Assessment: Geo-political Impact
Geoffrey Till provides a suitable framework for a net assessment of the geo-political impact on China’s Maritime Silk Road and Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum on regional security centred on the Straits of Malacca.[54] Both of these initiatives promote trade and raise issues about the relationship between trade and what Till calls dominion (domination or control).
Till presents four schools of thought:
The Manchester School that argues trade and the threat or use of force (war) are antithetical because private companies primarily compete for private gains. This school seems least relevant to the concerns of this paper because much of the focus on China’s trade is related to state-owned enterprises.
The second school argues that trade is not conducted in a strategic vacuum and the state has to intervene at some point in time. This could lead to state versus state conflict.
The third school argues that trade generates economic power and this in turn increases the resources available for the military in general and the navy in particular. According to this school of thought a state should pursue an advantage in trade to enhance the capacity for strategic dominion.
The fourth school argues that success in sea-based trade can usurp the role of military power at sea by shaping the way states behave. In other words, states can use their economic power as a lever of influence over another states.[55]
Till notes in his summary that the latter three schools on the role of trade and dominion are mutually supporting and in their broadest sense may be used to identify five major Chinese geo-political objectives behind it OBOR initiative (1) a general desire to reshape the world with a greater role for China; (2) winning friends and influencing people; (3) advantageous access to resources; (4) energy security (diversity sources and routes); and (5) reducing strategic vulnerability through Malacca Straits.[56]
Forty per cent of China’s trade passes through the Straits of Malacca. China views the straits as a point of vulnerability in times of crisis and is thus developing alternate routes for its energy needs. For example, normal shipping from Saudi Arabia to Shanghai via the Malacca Strait takes up to two weeks. The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic corridor has slashed transport times substantially. This has implications for the global oil market as well as the strategic importance of the Straits of Malacca and hence the geo-strategic calculations of Southeast Asian and other stakeholders.
India has a crucial role to play in the overall success of the One Belt One Road initiative. The ancient southwest Silk Road by land linked India to Chengdu and Kunming. Kolkata and Kalinga on the coast of Orissa provided maritime access the outside world. India’s non-participation could result in isolation.[57]
India is in need of massive investment for its infrastructure and that was no doubt a motivating factor in India’s decision to join the AIIB.[58] As yet neither India nor China has indicated any clear commitment to jointly developing infrastructure in India that would support the Maritime Silk Road.
The Maritime Silk Road will allow China to reduce risks of the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ through access to maritime facilities in the Indian Ocean, such as ports in Myanmar and Sri Lanka not to mention Pakistan.[59] The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor gives China enhanced strategic security and greater bargaining power and negotiation flexibility in resources market and transportation market.[60] In sum, China diversification of energy supplies and related transportation routes therefore serves its geo-political interests.[61]
If Asia’s future demands for quality infrastructure are met that will result in increased global trade by land and by sea, this will not reduce the importance of the Straits of Malacca as a vital transit corridor. Indeed, regional specialists forecast a rise in shipping passing through the Straits of Malacca in coming years.
If the OBOR initiative succeeds it will support China’s continuing economic growth. A larger Chinese economy will have more resources to advance China’s interests along the Maritime Silk Road and also will result in increased funding for the Chinese military and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in particular. The PLAN’s role in the South China Sea and western Pacific and Indian oceans will expand as part of the new normal ‘far seas activities’.[62]
China’s OBOR initiative is likely to achieve some success and improve connectivity along the Maritime Silk Road. This raises the salience of security for China’s SLOCs via the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean.
China will continue to give high priority to provide the funds to enhance ASEAN connectivity – modern highways, railways, ports, power lines, telecommunications, and pipelines. Mainland Southeast Asia will be drawn closer to China economically. According to one analyst, ‘At worst, it could turn ASEAN’s countries into southern Chinese provinces.’[63] And China will have more influence and leverage in Southeast Asia to promote a more China-centred economic (if not security) architecture.
According to Johnson, OBOR is comprehensive, focused and personal to President Xi.[64] China’s priority is internal development and modernization and promotion of stable external environment, including stable relations with the United States. China is not overtly seeking to be a disruptive power either regionally or globally (however China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea partly undercuts this argument because it raises regional tensions).
China’s OBOR initiative and increased economic and political leverage will induce the United States, Japan, India and other countries to respond with aid and investment inducements of their own to preserve their interests in Southeast Asia and to balance China.[65] Major power rivalry will continue to have both a bilateral and multilateral focus.
The emergence of the AIIB and other China-initiated multilateral banks will challenge the dominance of the global financial architecture established after the Second World War – World Bank, International Monetary Fund and later the ADB. Nevertheless, both sets of institutions will have a continuing role because the demand for investment in infrastructure will exceed the funding available from all sources.
There will also be competition about regional trade arrangements if the United States Senate ever approves the Trans Pacific Partnership. China’s will continue championing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and push to upgrade the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. [66]
China’s Maritime Silk Road will result in linking ports and maritime facilities from China’s east coast through the South China Sea to the western Indian Ocean. China will acquire access to and control over harbour facilities, marine logistics, security of transportation at sea, access to marine resources and the type of naval support and facilities that it lacks today.[67] There is little evidence of a push back by Southeast Asian states to China’s OBOR initiative.[68] They appear to welcome Chinese investment and this will result greater economic linkages to China as long as China can sustain its economic growth rate. A downturn in the Chinese economy would dent the Maritime Silk Road initiative. At the same time, Southeast Asian states will continue to rely on the United States for strategic balance.[69]
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[2] Gerald Chan, ‘China’s New Silk Road: A New Global Financial Order in the Making?,’ Paper presented to the Inaugural International Conference on China-US Relations in Global Perspective sponsored by the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand, 8-9 October 2015.
[3] Chan, ‘China’s New Silk Road: A New Global Financial Order in the Making?.’
[4] People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce, National Development and Reform Commission, Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, March 2015).
[5] Reuters, ‘China offers $11.5 billion in loans, credit to Southeast Asia,’ Bangkok Post, 23 March 2016.
[6] Dipankar Banerjee, ‘China’s One Belt One Road Initiative – An Indian Perspective,’ ISEAS Perspective, No. 14, 31 March 2016, 3; Christopher K. Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative: A Practical Assessment of the Chinese Communist Party’s Roadmap for China’s Global Resurgence. Report of the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2016, 17-18 and Luhulima, ‘Superimposition of China’s “silk road” and Indonesia’s maritime fulcrum.’
[7] Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 19-20 and Chan, ‘China’s New Silk Road: A New Global Financial Order in the Making?.’
[8] Chan, ‘China’s New Silk Road: A New Global Financial Order in the Making?.’
[9] For early accounts of Jokowi’s foreign policy see: Aaron L. Connelly, ‘Indonesian foreign policy under President Jokowi,’ Lowy Institute Analysis, Lowy Institute for International Policy, October 2014; Emizra Adi Syailendra, ‘Consensual Leadership in ASEAN: Will It Endure Under Jokowi?,’ RSIS Commentary No. 5, 7 January 2015; Phuong Nguyen, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Jokowi: A Giant Comes Knocking,’ cogitASIA (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies), 13 January 2015; Marvyn Piesse, ‘Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Regional impact of its Maritime Doctrine,’ Strategic Analysis Paper, Perth: Future Directions International, 29 January 2015; Donald Weatherbee, ‘The Incredible Shrinking Indonesia,’ PacNet No. 64, 23 September 2015; and Natasha Hamilton-Hart and Dave McRae, Indonesia: Balancing the United States and China, Aiming for Independence, Emerging US Security Partnerships in South-East Asia, Sydney: The United States Studies Centre, The University of Sydney, November 2015, 20-24.
[10] This concept is also translated as global maritime nexus or global maritime axis.
[11] Bentley, ‘Indonesia: An Emerging Maritime Power,’ 9-20; Marvyn Piesse, ‘The Indonesian Maritime Doctrine: Realising the Potential of the Ocean,’ Strategic Analysis Paper, Perth: Future Directions International, 22 January 2015 and Michael R. Calistro, ‘Indonesia’s maritime strategy: Jokowi’s gamble,’ PacNet Newsletter No. 66A, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, 5 October 2015.
[12] Gindarsah and Priamarizki, ‘Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns,’ 2.
[13] Banerjee, ‘China’s One Belt One Road Initiative – An Indian Perspective,’ 2.
[14] Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative, 11.
[15] Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative, 11.
[16] Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative, 11.
[17] Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative, 3 and 13. The CCP has set the goal of being a ‘moderately well-off society’ by 2020 and by 2049 China will ‘have built a modern socialist country that is strong, prosperous, democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious.’
[18] Quoted in Bentley, ‘Indonesia: An Emerging Maritime Power,’ 10.
[19] Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, March 2015), 2; see also Banerjee, ‘China’s One Belt One Road Initiative – An Indian Perspective,’ 2-3.
[20] Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 5.
[21] Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, March 2015), 10. There are reports that China excluded the Philippines from its Maritime Silk Road initiative; see: Andrew Browne, ‘China Bypasses Philippines in Its Proposed “Maritime Silk Road”,’ The Wall Street Journal, November 10, 2014. http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-bypasses-philippines-in-its-proposed-maritime-silk-road-1415636066.
[22] Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 10 and Chan, ‘China’s New Silk Road: A New Global Financial Order in the Making?.’ China financed two pipelines across Myanmar that bring Middle East oil and gas to cities in southwestern China. The pipelines across Myanmar run for 771 km and continue for another 1,631 km in China to reach Kunming, Chengdu and Chongqing. The total cost of this project was $2.5 billion.
[23] Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 12-23; see the discussion in Banerjee, ‘China’s One Belt One Road Initiative – An Indian Perspective,’ 5-6.
[24] Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 19-20.
[25] Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 15-26.
[26] Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 29.
[27] Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 30.
[28] Quoted in Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative,’ 1.
[29] Chan, “China’s New Silk Road: A New Global Financial Order in the Making?’ and Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative,’ 1.
[30] Sean Quirk and John Bradford. ‘Maritime Fulcrum: A New U.S. Opportunity to Engage Indonesia,’ Issues & Insights, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, October 2015, 2; Piesse, ‘Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Regional impact of its Maritime Doctrine;’ 4-6 and Gindarsah and Priamarizki, ‘Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns,’ 2.
[31] Bentley, ‘Indonesia: An Emerging Maritime Power,’ 10; and Gindarsah and Priamarizki. ‘Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns,’ 2-3.
[32] Gindarsah and Priamarizki, ‘Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns,’ 2-3.
[33] Bentley, ‘Indonesia: An Emerging Maritime Power,’ 17.
[34] Banerjee, ‘China’s One Belt One Road Initiative – An Indian Perspective,’ 7 and 9.
[35] Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative, 20.
[36] Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative,’ v, 18 and 20 and Geoffrey Till, ‘Dominion, Trade and the Maritime Silk Road: A Review of the Issues,’ Soundings No. 9, Canberra Sea Power Centre – Australia, 2016, 4.
[37] Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative,’ v.
[38] Bentley, ‘Indonesia: An Emerging Maritime Power,’ 15-16 and Piesse, ‘The Indonesian Maritime Doctrine: Realising the Potential of the Ocean,’ 5-8; Iis Gindarsah, ‘Indonesia’s Defence Diplomacy: Harnessing the Hedging Strategy Against Regional Uncertainties,’ RSIS Working Paper No. 293, Singapore: A. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 9 June 2015; and Gindarsah and Priamarizki, ‘Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns,’ 3-13.
[39] Gindarsah and Priamarizki, ‘Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns,’ 3-4 and Piesse, ‘The Indonesian Maritime Doctrine: Realising the Potential of the Ocean,’ 4.
[40] Gindarsah and Priamarizki, ‘Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns,’ 3-5 and 11-12.
[41] Hongzhou, ‘Indonesia’s War on Illegal Fishing: Impact on China,’ RSIS Commentary No. 192, September 2015, 1 and Gindarsah and Priamarizki, ‘Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns,’ 4.
[42] Luhulima, ‘Superimposition of China’s “silk road” and Indonesia’s maritime fulcrum’ and Piesse, ‘The Indonesian Maritime Doctrine: Realising the Potential of the Ocean,’ 3. For a brief overview of Indonesia’s relations with China see: Hamilton-Hart and McRae, Indonesia’ Balancing the United States and China, Aiming for Independence, 8-11.
[43] For concerns about China see: Till, ‘Dominion, Trade and the Maritime Silk Road: A Review of the Issues,’ 2-3 and 5-6; Lucio Blanco Pitlo, ‘Balancing the U.S. Rebalance,’ China-US Focus, 19 April 2016; Quirk and Bradford. ‘Maritime Fulcrum: A New U.S. Opportunity to Engage Indonesia,’ 3-5; Piesse, ‘The Indonesian Maritime Doctrine: Realising the Potential of the Ocean,’ 8; and Hamilton-Hart and McRae, Indonesia’ Balancing the United States and China, Aiming for Independence, 16-19.
[44] Quirk and Bradford. ‘Maritime Fulcrum: A New U.S. Opportunity to Engage Indonesia,’ 5-10; Kyodo, ‘Japan courts Indonesia with defence equipment as it seek to counter China’s influence in Asia,’ South China Morning Post, 17 December 2015; Reuters, ‘Japan, Indonesia to Solidify Security Ties,’ Voice of America News, 17 December 2015; Reiji Yoshida, ‘Japan, Indonesia hold first two-plus-two talks, agree to work toward transfer of defence weapons,’ Japan Times, 17 December 2015; Agence France Presse, ‘Japan, Indonesia agree on defence technology transfer talks,’ Yahoo News, 18 December 2015 and Reuters, ‘China offers $11.5 billion in loans, credit to Southeast Asia,’ Bangkok Post, 23 March 2016. For a brief overview of Indonesia’s relations with the United States see: Hamilton-Hart and McRae, Indonesia’ Balancing the United States and China, Aiming for Independence, 12-15.
[45] Gindarsah and Priamarizki, ‘Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns,’ 3 and Piesse, ‘The Indonesian Maritime Doctrine: Realising the Potential of the Ocean,’ 4.
[46] Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative,’ 21.
[47] Ye Xie and Phil Kuntz, ‘China GDP suspicions arise anew,’ The Australian Financial Review, 14 April 2016 and Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative,’ 2.
[48] This paragraph and the following two paragraphs draw heavily on Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative,’ vi , 10 and 21-23; see also Till, ‘Dominion, Trade and the Maritime Silk Road: A Review of the Issues,’ 5-8.
[49] Reuters, ‘China offers $11.5 billion in loans, credit to Southeast Asia,’ Bangkok Post, 23 March 2016.
[50] Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative,’ vi.
[51] Till, ‘Dominion, Trade and the Maritime Silk Road: A Review of the Issues,’ 6.
[52] Bentley, ‘Indonesia: An Emerging Maritime Power,’ 17.
[53] Scott Bentley, ‘Indonesia’s “global maritime nexus”: looming challenges at sea for Jokowi’s administration,’ The Strategist, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 26 May 2014 and Zhang, ‘Indonesia’s War on Illegal Fishing: Impact on China.’
[54] Till, ‘Dominion, Trade and the Maritime Silk Road: A Review of the Issues,’ 1-4.
[55] Till, ‘Dominion, Trade and the Maritime Silk Road: A Review of the Issues,’ 1.
[56] Till, ‘Dominion, Trade and the Maritime Silk Road: A Review of the Issues,’ 1 and 4-5.
[57] Banerjee, ‘China’s One Belt One Road Initiative – An Indian Perspective,’ 1, 3-4 and 7-8.
[58] Shao Yuqun, ‘Two Roads, But One Destination?,’ Paper presented to the Inaugural International Conference on China-US Relations in Global Perspective sponsored by the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand, 8-9 October 2015.
[59] Banerjee, ‘China’s One Belt One Road Initiative – An Indian Perspective,’ 1 and 3-4.
[60] Chan, “China’s New Silk Road: A New Global Financial Order in the Making?.’
[61] Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative,’ v.
[62] Banerjee, ‘China’s One Belt One Road Initiative – An Indian Perspective,’ 2.
[63] Stewart Taggart, ‘China’s Southeast Asia Infrastructure Drive,’ China-US Focus, 8 April 2016.
[64] Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative,’ v.
[65] Gindarsah and Priamarizki, ‘Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns,’ 6-9.
[66] Shao, ‘Two Roads, But One Destination?’; Peter Drysdale, ‘Beijing’s RCEP is a far bigger deal than Washington’s treaty,’ The Australian Financial Review, 27 April 2016; and Banerjee, ‘China’s One Belt One Road Initiative – An Indian Perspective,’ 9.
[67] Banerjee, ‘China’s One Belt One Road Initiative – An Indian Perspective,’ 9.
[68] Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative,’ 24.
[69] Chan, “China’s New Silk Road: A New Global Financial Order in the Making?.’
(Carlyle A. Thayer is Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra. Email: c.thayer@adfa.edu.au. All background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer))
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